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Law and Lawlessness
in a Socialist Society:
The Potential Impact of
Crime in East Germany
STEPHEN R. BOWERS

egime stability is a function of numerous factors: the extent to
which citizen expectations are satisfied, popular identificaR
tion with the system, and acceptance of governmental legitimacy
are but a few of the most obvious. Compliance with laws is yet
another component in the catalogue of indicators of regime stability. Since most facets of modern society are founded on some legal
provision, compliance or noncompliance with the law as well as official reactions to lawlessness are important factors in evaluating
the stability of a political order.
The significance of law violations is dependent on the nature of
the laws being violated. Offenses relating directly to national
security, for example, are different from those against public
order. Western legal conceptions are based on the proposition that
some offenses are political and of public relevance while others are
distinctly private and nonpolitical. Therefore, Western
democracies are able to tolerate much lawlessness without jeopardizing the stability of the system. This generally held distinction
between political and nonpolitical matters insulates the political
heart of the system, the government itself, from the effects of most
crime. While no criminal act is acceptable, some are less unacceptable than others.
Stephen R. Bowers is a visiting professor at the School of International
Studies, USAIMA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on leave from Berry
College, Mount Berry, Georgia.
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This convenient distinction between political and nonpolitical
offenses is less apparent in Communist party states. In those
systems, some offenses (most traffic violations, for example) are
regarded as both nonpolitical and of no social significance, but
because socialist theory eliminates so many distinctions between
public and private behavior the scope of official concern is much
greater than in the West and more offenses have political impact.
Thus, a great many violations of law that do not carry the opprobrium of a high political crime, such as treason, are nevertheless of considerable political significance.
To examine the relationship between crime and regime stability,
this paper will consider the incidence of crime in the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) and official treatment of that issue.
Selection of the GDR for such a study is useful because this nation
is generally regarded as the most prosperous of the Communist
party states, and the Socialist Unity Party's (SED) technologically
adaptive policies seem to have produced a comfortable wedding of
doctrinaire ideology and modern technical innovation.
It is a fundamental contention of this paper that while
lawlessness does not necessarily constitute a threat to the stability
of a non-Communist state, it does pose such a menace to the
socialist regime. The current relevance of this topic need not be
based on the proposition that crime has increased in East Germany, but on the simple fact of its persistence.
The persistence of crime has a special meaning for a socialist
state, one not produced in capitalist society. Because of the party's
contention that criminal conduct will disappear when socialist conditions prevail, law violations in socialist society raise an
ideological problem. Marx wrote of the association of alienation
with the appearance of private property and an antagonistic division of labor. The alienation of man from nature and from other
men was, in Marx's terms, a product of a class environment and
feature of capitalism. Its most common manifestations were
asocial behavior and criminal conduct, both of which were to
disappear with a social evolution toward communism. Yet, in spite
of the GDR's steady evolution toward full socialism, asocial
behavior and criminal conduct still abound. Not only is
lawlessness a feature of the GDR's socialist society, but it even
assumes forms seen in nonsocialist nations.
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Forms of Crime in the GDR
Table 1 lists, in order of gravity, the socially unacceptable acts
plaguing the GDR. Until recently the unavailability of data on
crime made statistical analyses impossible. In 1978, however, officials published crime data in their statistical yearbook, the first
such figures since 1970. Those figures were analyzed by Arnold
Freiburg in an illuminating article in Deutschland-Archiv.
Freiburg begins his examination by noting the SED's claims of a
dramatic decline in crime, a decline documented by use of a persuasive "index figure" (1946 = 100). Today, according to the
GDR's statisticians, crime is down to only 24.6 percent of what it
was in the 1946-48 period. Bypassing official statistical surgery
and discounting as questionable the use of figures from the 1940s
(during which order was only loosely established), Freiburg concludes that while the number of crimes has declined since the immediate postwar years, that decline has been smaller than one
would expect after the decriminalization of petty crimes in 1968
(see Table 2 for his presentation of trends). In the 1970s, the
number of persons convicted actually increased significantly after
a decline in the 1960s. That increase is all the more remarkable
since it came during a period of virtually zero population growth.
This increase, in spite of tremendous educational and socialization
efforts of the regime, must be especially disappointing.
The locations of districts with greatest incidence of crime is
another disquieting finding of these statistics. The places with the
greatest problems, Berlin, FrankfurtiOder, Neubrandenburg, and
Schwerin, are all in the north, the region with the youngest population base in East Germany. According to Freiburg's study, the
younger the population, the higher the number of criminal incidents. Looking at the figures by category of offense, Freiburg
identifies theft, fraud, and embezzlement as most significant,
together constituting 50 percent of all crimes. Murder has held
constant since 1969 while economic crime has gone down. On the
other hand, robbery and blackmail are up drastically as is
rowdyism, an offense generally associated with the young.!
Among crimes, the attitudinal problems cited in the GDR media
are taken most seriously, although they may appear trivial to the
outsider. A 1978 article in Neue Justiz reflected the tone of general
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Table I.-Hierarchy of Asocial or Deviant Behavior Cited in Media
Category

Illustration

1. Attitudinal
shortcomings

arrogance, self-satisfaction,
lack of discipline, unwillingness
to work

2. Minor misconduct or
routine violations of
social discipline
3. Rowdyism

walking on lawns, violation of
no-smoking rules, damage to
public property
beatings, defiance of FDJ patrols,
public disturbances

4. Petty theft

fraud, embezzlement by store clerks
economic offenses

5. Serious 'white collar'
crime
6. Robbery and blackmail
7. Serious violence

extortion, burglary
murder

Table 2.-Freiburg's Presentation of GDR Crime Trend
1950-59
Crimes at annual average
1960-1969: 100
Offenders at annual average
1960-1969: 100
Convicted at annual average
1960-1969: 100
Placed before social courts
at an annual average
1960-1969: 100
Convicted and placed before
courts at an annual average
1960-1969: 100

157,466
119

76,953"
139

76,953
100

1960-69

1970-77

132,741
100
98,509
100
55,319 b
100

124,206
94
94,254
96
62,030
112

21,816 c
100

23,351
107

77,135
100

85,381
111

aup to and including 1954 without East Berlin.
b1969 not included.
<Prom 1961 to 1968 inclusively.

discussion of these problems with its references to contradictions
in the social processes. Expanding this theme, the authors, Professor Dr. Erich Buchholz and Dr. Irmgard Buchholz, both of
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Humbolt University, declared that "imperialist influences" were
evident in the exhibition by some young people of "manifestations
of presumption and know-all, arrogance and intransigence."2
Such people, suggested the authors, are not only unpleasant but,
more importantly, likely future law offenders.
The fate of arrogant youth, lacking enthusiasm for work, is
presented in excessively grim terms by East German authorities.
Dr. Lothar Reuter, the GDR's public prosecutor, described a
"typical case" several years ago involving a youthful offender
employed on a job less than four weeks in his entire life. According to Reuter, because of his unwillingness to work the young man
finally ended up in court and was sent to prison. 3
The youth's attitudinal shortcomings eventually led to "violations of social discipline," a more serious category of deviant
behavior. This category of behavior was described in a 1978 Polish
account of juvenile delinquency in the GDR: damage to school
furniture, ruining of seats on buses, and general destructiveness
for the sake of amusement are illustrations. 4
Still another example used by East German sociologists is the excessive use of stimulants and tranquilizers in the GDR. During the
past decade, consumption of psychopharmacological remedies by
East Germans has increased 900 percent, a development which
many view as an indication of social instability. 5
Closely related to routine violations of social discipline is a widely
discussed type of offense referred to as rowdyism, something
westerners describe as juvenile delinquency. A typical case was the
much publicized incident in 1979, involving two teenagers, aged
seventeen and eighteen, who "threatened members of FDJ groups
for the maintenance of order and . . . knocked one of them
down." For this misconduct, the elder of the two drew a sixmonth prison term and a 500-mark fine while the seventeen-yearold was sentenced to eight weeks in a juvenile prison. 6
Still more serious during this time of economic difficulties in the
GDR are the numerous cases of petty theft, which generally involve lone individuals driven by the desire to supplement their incomes by taking money or goods from the enterprises for which
they work. Two well-publicized cases illustrate these activities:
1) a part-time store clerk who withheld sales slips from customers
so she could take the money herself after falsifying inventory
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reports; and, 2) an employee of a chemical company who acquired automotive tires, tubes, and "luxuries," such as hubcaps,
by charging them to the enterprise. 7
Sometimes thievery is on a grander, more systematic scale and
consequently poses a threat to the national economy. The dimensions of East German "white collar" crime were demonstrated by
the 1976 convictions in Leipzig of almost every member of the
work force and management of a canning plant for systematically
diverting entire shipments of canned goods from the factory into
their own black market operation. 8 Illegal building is another ex~
ample of this category of lawlessness, one which has even received
a specific public denunciation by SED General Secretary
Honecker. In 1979 the Schwerin Bezirk court sentenced a
Mecklenburg mayor and four others to prison terms and fines for
illegally building a holiday village of thirty bungalows, social
buildings, and paved roads. Workers were recruited for this illegal
project by the offer of higher wages than those given for projects
associated with the kreis economic plan. The severe sentences
given to the architects of this scheme were hailed as warnings to all
officials. 9 Shortcomings in the GDR construction sector have also
resulted in graft in some state housing administrations. In 1979
Neues Deutschland reported sentences given to five administrators
who had been taking bribes for improperly assigning new apartments in Dessau. The five received prison sentences of up to five
years and fines of as much as 50,000 marks. 10
Perhaps even more disturbing to the SED is the frequency of
robbery and violent crime. The harshest critics of Communist
regimes have generally recognized the numerous security
mechanisms of those states as sufficient to make the individual
secure against robbery and physical violence. However, recent
statistics and media attention attest to an increase in robberies and
the persistence of homicide. An issue of Junge Welt, the Free German Youth (FDJ) daily, drew attention to the case of a seventeenyear-old boy, said to be the product of a "good" East German
family, who robbed and beat a pregnant woman. 11 Publicity given
to incidents of homicide, a "statistically imperceptible" matter in
the tableau of East German crime, we are told, indicates official
alarm even though such occurrences have not increased since 1969.
One of the most discussed cases occurred in Magdeburg where a

158

World Affairs

twenty-year-old man was executed following his conviction for the
murders of his teenage girlfriend, her roommate, and a young man
visiting in their apartment. Reports of the crime were linked with
demands for an exploration of organizational failure in dealing
with the offender. 12
Causes of Crime
Recognizing that crime does exist in the GDR and that it is of
significant dimensions, it is important to ascertain the reasons for
its existence. Our distant location and restrictions on research in
East Germany will not permit the sort of examination demanded
for research on Western problems, but it is useful to at least examine official views. East German authorities' explanations fit
within two basic approaches; one, apparently intended for popular
consumption, rests on the proposition that pernicious capitalist influences alone are the productive factor while the other considers
sophisticated ideological and scientific factors. The popular approach was enunciated by Chief Judge Joachim Schlegel of the
GDR Supreme Court, who suggested: "There is a small group of
young people who, above all under the influence of ideological
diversion by the adversary, commit criminal acts and acts impairing social life, such as hooliganism, aggression toward fellow
citizens, disturbances of meetings, or disregard for public order
and state authority." 13 Numerous other commentators echo and
broaden this theme by emphasizing "moral damage" resulting
from contacts with westerners, listening to popular Western
music, and watching television programs from the FRG.
Yet there is also an effort to explain criminality by considering
more than "imperialist influences." These more recent endeavors
have been encouraged by Humbolt University's criminal law
authorities Walter Henning and John Lekschas. They maintain
that while "imperialist influences" are a factor, criminality is also
a product of "relics of an egoistic-individualistic, impulsiveanarchistic nature" in the social environment of socialist society.
This, they admit, is an apparent contradiction of the widely held
belief that "with the complete evolution of communist social relationships . . . and communist personalities, criminality will be
overcome. Communism and criminality are not only incompatible
with one another, they exclude one another." 14
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The key, we are assured, lies in the as-yet incomplete evolution
of society. With the further development of socialist society, the
relics of the old order will be identified and fully eliminated.
Meanwhile, one may expect to see phenomena such as juvenile
criminality even though the youth have never lived under
capitalism and sometimes become criminals under conditions of a
developed socialist society. Yet, it is important to note that
criminality in socialist society is not a protest against prevailing
conditions, as in capitalism, but merely the result of influences
from imperialism and of relics from the old, exploitative society. It
remains something that is foreign to the nature of socialism and
will, with time and effort, be eradicated. 15
A final interpretative element of lawlessness in socialist society is
biological and psychological anomalies. The general conclusion
regarding these factors is that they acquire special weight only in
cases of insanity or near-insanity. Even then, their explanatory
value applies only to individual cases and does not account for the
overall phenomenon of crime. Biological and psychological factors, authorities believe, cannot produce a fatal predisposition to
crime because the man-environment relationship is always the
decisive element. Crime, even involving people suffering from
biological or psychological anomalies, is socially determined. 16
Official expositions on the causes of crime, though interesting,
have much less explanatory value than alternative analyses offered
by observers outside of party circles. Many of these views are
founded on the proposition that crime is less a result of remnants
of the old order than a product of socialist society itself. This contention is a fundamental attack on the nature of
socialism-especially the economic performance of the
system-and underscores the grave ideological problem raised by
the persistence of crime in the GDR.
A Swedish journal advanced one such theme in a 1979 treatment
of East German social problems. Considering the attitudes of the
GDR's youth, author Richard Swartz suggested that large groups
of young people have difficulty "finding their place" in East Germany's "overpedagogical and regulated society." Widespread
apathy, he wrote, now exists among youth as a "reaction against
the guardianship of society ... and a political situation in which
the opportunities of the individual citizen to participate and in-
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fluence his society are often reduced to pure ritual." 17 The failure
of the economic system to offer sufficient compensations to offset
limited political and social opportunities for young people undoubtedly underscores this sense of alienation.
Lawlessness might also be attributed, at least in some cases, to
simple boredom, an almost certain by-product of any planned,
thoroughly regulated society. Sometimes the recalcitrance of
bored youth takes relatively innocuous forms but official expressions of concern have become more emphatic with reports of
youthful prostitution and burglary. Incidents of this nature suggest that the youth population is affected by cynicism so often
viewed as peculiar to Western young people only. While there is no
evidence that boredom and cynicism have produced a revolutionary situation among the GDR's youth, it may be appropriate
to speak of a "generation gap" of at least minor proportions.
In addition, East German lawlessness might be viewed as part of
what some analysts see as a generally declining popular morale.
Although the most frequently cited symptom of what a West German newspaper described as an "erosion of confidence" among
the East German population 18 has been the large number of East
German requests for resettlement in the Federal Republic, it is not
unreasonable to view crime as still further evidence of this problem. Morale problems may be particularly evident in crimes with
some economic significance-robbery, for example-during a
time when Western goods, offered at high prices, have become
more common in East German shops. Many nonsocialist critics are
convinced that popular greed and envy rather than general consumer satisfaction have been the products of Honecker's "goulash
and jeans socialism." 19 VW Rabbits and West German salad dressings have become not only the mark of success for the more fortunate East Germans but also, in the eyes of low-income citizens,
evidence of the existence of a privileged "new class" in the GDR.
An additional contributing factor, as much of the preceding
suggests, may be the GDR's worsening economic situation. For
several years the economy has been suffering from the impact of
higher market prices for industrial raw materials as well as such
consumer goods as coffee and cocoa. Increases in prices for these
and many other items have led to shortages of hard currency, offset only in part by higher road customs for Western visitors and
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other ventures designed to bring in Western currencies. (In 1981,
the minimum exchange amount for one-day visits to East Berlin
was increased from 6.5 to 25 marks.) In the face of reduced supplies of valued consumer goods, Honecker expanded the intershop
system as a means of distributing Western products while soaking
up convertible currencies. 20 Meanwhile, state-sanctioned corruption has begun to spread as citizens join in an effort to acquire
non socialist bank notes by any means possible. Consequently, the
skilled worker who used to perform after-hours chores for West
German cigarettes or coffee now demands payment in West German marks. In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that frustrated
citizens lacking the required funds might turn to burglary. There
are, of course, no data available to support or refute this conjecture.
The SED's Anticrime Program
The party's effort to combat crime is unique in its emphasis on
attainment of the "proper ideological alignment." East German
authorities have prefaced their summons to battle with an insistence that the undertaking be given highest priority. "Order,
discipline, and security," authorities declare, "is the most important requirement for the further shaping of the developed socialist
society." Development of "socialist democracy" requires that
order and discipline be maintained not only in the early stages of
societal evolution, but at every step of development. With this
declaration, regime spokesmen remove the ideological basis for
any eventual dismantling of the growing police apparatus. 21
The socialist anticrime efforts, however, are not to be confused
with those of capitalist nations. The latter, according to Professor
Dr. Erich Buchholz, are confined to superficial measures and "at
best include some preventive, welfare and social-educational provisions." Basic social conditions, unaffected by those endeavors,
are the primary focus of the socialist crime prevention program.
Under socialism the "unity of crime prevention and crime fighting
represents a necessary element in the organization of the Communist system of society." 22 Thus, it is argued, the social contradictions leading to crime are eliminated.
A concentration on political and social factors as well as the
purely criminal features of lawbreaking ensures attainment of the
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proper ideological alignment. This, of course, is a departure from
non-Communist police work but is a necessary concomitant of law
enforcement in the SED's system. The Ministry of Interior began a
full application of this concept in 1974 with an intensification of
political-ideological training for detectives. 23
In addition to its ideological component, the SED program contains elements of permissiveness blended with the coercive
characteristics normally associated with these undertakings. The
permissive theme, evidently based on the assumption that at least
some crime results from popular disaffection, includes, first, increased attention to the general well-being of the population.
Thus, attention has been called to a number of immediate shortcomings. some of which were summarized in a 1978 issue of Staat
und Recht. According to Dr. Heidrun Pohl and Professor Dr.
Gerhard Schulze, both of the GDR Academy of Political Science
and Jurisprudence, some of the principal deficiencies are the slow
processing of citizen petitions by communal authorities, the fact
that citizens are not given concrete answers to petitions, and that
certain requests are not confirmed at all. These failures, the
authors observe, undermine confidence in the state and thereby
. IatlOns.
·
24
promote a situation more favorab Ie to Iaw VlO
A second feature of the permissive theme, greater sensitivity to
public opinion, was detailed by Drs. Gunter Schneider and Ewald
Wachter, also associates of the Academy of Political Science and
Jurisprudence. After citing state treatment of public opinion as the
"weakest link" in the mastery of ideological processes and informational activity, Schneider and Wachter call for a more careful
analysis of public opinion and an increased effort to ensure
popular feedback regarding state programs. Success, in their view,
will reduce popular discontent and help further establish the
legitimacy of the SED's regime. According to their standard,
"State public opinion work must ... contribute to the shaping and
further development of a public opinion which is characterized in
its ideological content by a conviction of the lawfulness of our victory and the superiority in principle of our social order. ... " 25
An illustration of the permissive trend in action, it appears on
first examination, is the 1979 amnesty declared by the GDR State
Council to commemorate the nation's thirtieth anniversary. This
amnesty, the fourth in a series which began in 1951, will eventually
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cover 20,000 prisoners, 84 of whom are West German citizens
scheduled to be returned to the FRG. Under amnesty terms, local
authorities must find jobs for amnestied GDR citizens and assist in
their reintegration into society. Individuals with records of
previous convictions, in line with offical concern over the problem
of recidivism, were not included in the amnesty. 26 The
humanitarian nature of this action, however, has been challenged
by critics who argue that a reduction in the number of prisoners
was necessary simply to make room for new prisoners. A West
German newspaper also suggested that this large amnesty, coming
so recently after the 1972 amnesty, is proof of the severity of the
East German penal system, because it indicates that the GDR's
prison population is proportionately much larger than that of the
Federal Republic. 27
Crime prevention through education is an important component
of the SED's program. This undertaking enlists homes, schools,
and factories and takes as its starting point providing young people
with an education in the "joys of work" so they will realize that
work is an honor and a social duty. Factories contribute to promotion of discipline by developing "socialist attitudes toward
work. "28 Working on the assumption that a low educational level
is a cause of youthful criminal behavior, in 1975 the GDR began to
provide a ten-grade advanced education for inmates of juvenile
prisons. The "educational value of socially useful labor" is also
recognized by East German authorities and in 1974 they began extensive employment of convicts in factories throughout the nation.
While some might see this as reminiscent of forced labor,
authorities stress the educational value rather than the economic
potential of the practice and emphasize that it is simply an element
of "citizenship training" for prisoners. 29
A more formal element of this approach is the law indoctrination and education program. Law indoctrination, in the SED's
view , "is always concerned with providing convictions .and
knowledge with respect to the pronouncements of MarXlsmLeninism on the state, law and democracy, and on the realization
of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism in real socialism, while
simultaneously aggressively and valiantly carrying on the
ideological dispute with imperialism in this field. "30 Specialists
stress the requirement for a significant ideological impact in this

164

World Affairs

program and "law propagandists" are assigned the duty of "raising the ideological content ... and efficacy" of law indoctrination. The ideological conflict with imperialism rather than the persistence of crime is offered as justification for an intensification of
this effort.
As law indoctrination endeavors are advanced with renewed fervor, legal authorities remind party workers that previous educational programs have been inadequate. Drs. Erich and Irmgard
Buchholz offered a very general view with their reference in 1978
to "various contradictions in the educational process" relating to
young people who have "difficulties with discipline." In their
view, educational shortcomings may lead to mistakes in evaluating
the ability and willingness of juvenile criminals to "adopt a more
appropriate social conduct in the future."3! Numerous leaders of
the academic community have identified specific failures of the
GDR's educational program. The ideological and political content
of educational instruction is a constant worry. Misgivings about
this aspect of the GDR's efforts were expressed by Professor
Gerhart Neuner, president of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences,
who complained that students' knowledge about ideological and
sociological interrelationships is superficial. Concepts, Neuner
argues, are reduced to meaningless cliches in the minds of too
many students.32 Another target of criticism is the liberalization
trend apparent in some facets of the educational program of the
GDR. Professor Dr. Adolf Kossakowski, director of the Institute
for Pedagogic Psychology, has charged that "some of our
students' behavioral problems which give us trouble in the schools,
in the family, and in public life, must to a large extent be attributed to an uncertainty about norms on the part of the public,
the parents and some of the teachers and educators, as well as to
an unjustified liberalization in regard to educational standards." 33
Kossakowski's theme demonstrates the transition in policy from
the permissive to the coercive, a transition in which he couples a
call for consistency and uniformity in educational standards with
demands for greater discipline among young people.
Law indoctrination and education also involve the focusing of
public attention on trial proceedings, apparently on the assumption that pUblicity will have an educational effect. Official intentions became obvious in 1979 as local newspapers began to publish
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more accounts of criminal proceedings, especially those involving
young people. Local publications, of course, are not generally
available in the West, so their use offered the prospect of a limited
audience, the East German population, which was to be the
beneficiary of the lessons projected in the official proceedings.
Another variation in the effort to bring details of trials to the
public's attention is the practice of bringing an "expanded public"
into the court. Thus in a 1979 case in Cottbus, six young people
employed at the Cottbus slaughterhouse, charged with acting in
disregard of public safety, were brought to trial within a matter of
days in what were termed "accelerated proceedings," which were
conducted at their place of work in the presence of fellow
workers. 34
Although not primarily an educational activity, punishment
itself is also regarded as an educational tool. East German legal
specialists emphasize the creation of situations in which the
criminal is given the opportunity to prove himself and "thus meet
his social responsibilities in the future." Certain types of punishment are much more conducive to this than others, so preference is
given to suspended sentences rather than imprisonment where
possible, especially for juvenile offenders. The educational
possiblities of this option are realized by giving the offender social
responsibility. In view of the serious problem of recidivism in the
GDR, it is clear that authorities do take the educational function
of punishment seriously. Their recognition of the limits of penal
law as an educational device is reflected in pronouncements that
the process of reeducation is an overall social task shared by many
public and private institutions. Accordingly, numerous agencies
without direct connections to the penal system-youth organizations, unions, schools, and the family-are called upon to aid in
the rehabilitation of criminals. 35
An examination of these educational programs gives a good indication of the special concerns of the nation's leadership. The
themes that most clearly emerge show that the SED is troubled by
youth criminality, recidivism, and crimes against property. The
latter especially demonstrates the crucial role of economic prosperity as a basis of legitimacy for the SED's regime, a fact about
which there has been much comment by Western analysts. 36 Erosion of the economic basis for East German stability would have
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dramatic consequences that would likely be reflected in crimes
against property. The numerous expressions of alarm about the
seriousness of this category of offense indicate that such an erosion may now be taking place.
Going beyond educational efforts, officials also detail a series of
directly preventive measures to deter crime by both juveniles and
adults. In December of 1978, the GDR Supreme Court outlined
goals and tasks in the effort to combat crime, especially among
young people. An improvement in criminal proceedings, relative
to both legal instruments as well as social forces, is one of the first
points cited. Equally important, in the court's view, is the "struggle" to keep young people from coming into contact with "hostile,
demoralizing, and criminal influences."37 The latter measure is
particularly relevant to the effort to prevent rather than simply
punish crime. Helmut Nedwig, chief of the Main Department for
Criminal Police, echoed this theme in 1979 as he urged
criminologists to direct their main efforts toward prevention of
crimes, especially those against the economy and socialist and personal property. Nedwig, expressing official dissatisfaction about
techniques being employed, demanded an improvement in the
analytical work of the criminal police. 38
The preventive effort also centers on a call for reinforcement of
public confidence. According to SED statements, public confidence would be strengthened by improvement of the political and
economic bases of the socialist social and state system. Popular
confidence in the law and maintenance of law, SED legal
specialists argue, is possible only as citizens are assured that their
socialist lifestyle will be protected. As with previous facets of the
SED anticrime program, the protection of socialist property
receives specific attention. The protection and augmentation of
socialist property, we are told, represents the "vital basis for the
improvement of the people's material and cultural standard of living." 39 The utility of this approach becomes obvious if one accepts
the proposition that crimes against property cause the SED its
greatest anxiety today.
Encouragement of popular participation in law enforcement activities is another facet of the GDR's preventive effort. The most
evident expression of popular participation is the voluntary
assistance force which supplements the People's Police. After
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twenty-five years in operation, this organization boasts over
100,000 citizens who are regularly involved in supporting the work
of the People's Police. The emphasis of their work is on the
prevention of crimes and the elimination of the causes and conditions promoting crime outside the major cities. 40 The desire for
popular participation manifests itself most often in discussions
about juvenile crime. According to Drs. Roland Muller and
Lothar Reuter, attorneys with the General Prosecuting Attorney's
Office, "one of the most important considerations" in the prevention of juvenile delinquency is that juveniles themselves should actively cooperate in crime prevention. Young people who choose to
do so generally work with the Youth Help organization, a partysponsored group responsible for prevention of juvenile delinquency.41 Finally, citizens are reminded of their obligations to prevent conditions conducive to crime. One trial account, for example, concluded with a cautionary note against keeping large
amounts of cash or expensive liquor at home. Yet, in spite of all
that is being done to enlist popular participation, no official complacency is evident. The GDR's prosecutor general, Dr. Josef
Streit, has demanded that "the working people's participation in
crime fighting" must become "still more effective. ,,42
Where preventive efforts do not succeed, there is, of course, the
alternative of punitive measures to be taken against offenders.
Table 3 presents common punishments for specified crimes. The
most common, in the case of juveniles, is the probationary
sentence. The advantage of this sentence, with its broad opportunities for education of the offender, is that it gives the young
person who has gotten into trouble the opportunity to prove
himself in school or at his place of work. Probationary sentences
and fines are also imposed as punishments for relatively minor offenses. Restitution is another common punitive device used most
frequently when a criminal act has occurred in conjunction with a
"negative attitude toward work." Work without pay enables the
individual to compensate for the misdeed while also learning from
his mistake. 43
In contrast with the leniency implied by these measures,
authorities are willing to impose more severe penalties in an increasing number of cases. In 1979 the Supreme Court asked all
lower courts to punish crimes against property, especially socialist
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Table 3.-The Range of Punishments in the GDR

Category of Offense

Most Frequent Sanctions

Attitudinal
shortcomings
Minor misconduct or routine
violations of social
discipline
Rowdyism

public reprimand, organizational
'missionary' work, probation
public reprimand, organizational
'missionary' work, fines,
restitution, probation
public reprimand, organizational
'missionary' work, fines,
restitution, limited personal
restrictions, short prison terms
fines, short or medium prison
terms, restitution
medium prison terms

Petty theft
Serious 'white collar'
crime
Robbery and blackmail
Serious violence

medium prison terms
medium or long prison terms,
execution

property, more severely. The court demanded that this apply with
special force to more serious crimes as well as those committed by
recidivists. Moreover, punishment is not to be made primarily
dependent upon how much damage was caused but equally upon
the attitude and motives of the offender. Crimes prompted by
greed, wastefulness, the pursuit of lUXury items, or the desire to
lead an extravagant life-style must, according to the court, be
punished most harshly. 44 The increasingly severe sentences being
meted out for roWdyism is another reflection of the view that leniency is not always appropriate. After courts sentenced over a
dozen young people to prison terms of up to fourteen months as
punishment for damaging a train while celebrating the outcome of
a soccer match in 1978, the SED paper Markische Volksstime
warned that the "full harshness of our socialist laws" would be applied to such people in the future. "Velvet gloves," the paper
editorialized, will not be used, because working people have the
right to expect "decisive and unambiguous reactions from the
organs of justice and security" when rowdies destroy public property and endanger public order and security. 45
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The assignment of sentences, it should be noted, reflects an emphasis upon ideological considerations. Dr. Erich Buchholz,
writing of the needs of a "scientific doctrine on sentencing," suggests that a proper understanding of the social development of the
nation results in sentences which take into account the social effects of the crime. 46 If those sentences become more severe, it is a
response to the seriousness with which the criminal actions are
viewed and a recognition of their total societal impact.
The trend toward more stringent repression of violations of
"social discipline" has even spread to the GDR's universities. The
new disciplinary rules, effective with the 1977178 academic year,
revealed the breadth of official efforts. The new rules, while expanding certain student rights, tightened disciplinary procedures
considerably. The objectives of the new regulations are to
strengthen the legal consciousness and politico-moral behavior of
students; to promote a greater consciousness of responsibility
among students; and to remove the politico-ideological causes of
"erroneous" behavior. Responsibilities of the FDJ for accomplishment of these objectives were greatly expanded and
students also assumed greater "material responsibility" for any
damage to property in the course of their student lives. 47
The most extensive moves in this direction came in 1979 with
passage by the Volkskammer of the so-called "third criminal
amendment" and other new legal provisions. As a result of the
Volkskammer's actions, the GDR's authorities have "more opportunities to prevent criminal actions," "attacks" on the SED's
system will be "more effectively prevented," public order is
generally strengthened, police have "wider possibilities" for securing evidence, and customs and foreign exchange regulations are
expanded. In announcing introduction of this legislation, the SED
daily Neues Deutschland asserted that the GDR is "one of the
safest countries on earth." Justification for the tighter laws is based
not on an increase in crime, but on the need to respond to "increased sabotage and agitation against the GDR and its citizens."
The source of this threat is presumably the capitalist West, for, as
Neues Deutschland observes, "it must naturally be taken into consideration that the GDR is situated at the juncture of the two large
social systems. "48
A blurring of the distinctions between political and nonpolitical
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offenses becomes even more obvious after examination of the
security provisions of this legislation. These ~e~s~res refor~u~ate
the concept of espionage and broaden the defmltlon of a cnmmal
act in such a way as to label oppositional forces as common
criminals. This is not a new approach but simply a recent
manifestation of an official East German tendency to find political
implications in ordinary cases, something which ?tto Kirch.heimer
noted in his Political Justice two decades ago. 4 , MeanwhIle, the
minimum penalty for criticizing the GDR's political system or
authorities in public has been increased from two to three years'
imprisonment. "Antistate incitement,': more serious. but closely
related to public criticism, is made pumshable by a pnson term of
at least eight years, up from five years. 50
An eniargement of military-security-criminal functions is
another manifestation of the tendency to merge criminal and
political law enforcement. The expansion of the jurisdiction of
miiitary courts in 1979 signaled a move to give the milit~ry
authorities new responsibilities in law enforcement. Effectlve
August 1, 1979, pursuant to a regulation passed by the National
Defense Council, civilian employees of the National People's
Army, the GDR Border Troops, civil defense and alternative
military service organizations may be tried in military instead of
civilian courts. 51 Shortly afterward, the Council of Ministers issued
a decree extending the military obligations of citizens and enterprises. According to the decree, which took effect on October 1,
1979, in time of peace enterprises and cooperatives can be required
to provide vehicles, machines, and spare parts for the military, and
civilians are obligated to "render services" requested by the
military. 52 As the East German national defense law was being
amended, the National Defense Council gave SED General
Secretary Honecker much broader, sweeping authority in the
military sphere. Honecker's military role was further bolstered by
the appointment of his close confidant, Lt. Gen. Fritz Streletz, as
Chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army. 53
Conclusion
An examination of the SED's approach to crime over the past
few years supports several observations. The most obvious
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presented by available data is that official expectations have been
scaled down from that earlier time when Marxist prophets saw an
almost total elimination of criminality with the development of an
advanced socialist society. A more realistic assessment prevails today as East German authorities simply speak of a "constant
decrease of crime in the socialist states." 54 Yet, the persistence of
criminal behavior has not resulted in application of the Draconian
measures of which a state such as the GDR is capable. Granted,
coercive measures have been intensified in some cases, but there
has also been an increased emphasis on more positive educational
programs and on improving responsiveness to public opinion. In
short, there has been a comfortable blending of somewhat per-·
missive or "liberal" elements with coercive force.
Retention of a strong ideological emphasis has been part of the
"liberal" aspect of the SED's program. The ideological concentration appears first in the party's examination of the causes of crime.
Lack of adequate ideological emphasis is repeatedly cited as a
primary contributing factor in the persistence of crime. Official
concern for the class basis of the fight against crime is reflected in
party pronouncements on the necessity of viewing lawlessness as a
social phenomenon rather than an individual manifestation of deviance. This has not prevented extensive efforts to battle individual acts, but it does demonstrate the SED's continuing desire
to maintain the proper ideological alignment. This orientation is
also developed by the popular legal-educational programs as well
as the ideological training required for East German detectives.
While the range of criminal activities in the GDR covers the
spectrum of what one might expect in the West, official attention
is drawn to several key difficulties. The primary concerns, in the
SED's view, are the rising number of property crimes, the increase
in juvenile delinquency, and the high rate of recidivism. The problem of offenses against property is demonstrated by the numerous
public statements demanding greater respect for property.
With mounting economic woes facing the GDR in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, crimes against property clearly occupied first
place in official consciousness. Lack of respect for socialist property raises a special question, since it reveals a fundamental lack of
appreciation for the concept of socialist order. The preoccupation
with juvenile crime fell close behind in the SED's efforts while
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recidivism has received somewhat less attention. But, as restrictions on the most recent amnesty indicate, the latter is viewed
as a serious shortcoming. Stress on the educational function of
punishment is yet another reflection of this perception.
A final observation is in order regarding the economic impact of
crime. The expansion of the customs and foreign exchange regulations in 1979 and 1981 underscores the effort to provide greater
protection of economic assets. Taken together with more extensive
measures to prevent crimes against property. this action provides a
convincing picture of an East Germany very much concerned
about its economic well-being. The close relationship between
prosperity and political stability in most societies has long been
recognized generally and there is no reason why the SED's leadership should not share this perception. It must also realize that the
popular perspectives of the 1980s are very different from those of
the 1950s and 1960s. Expectations of this decade will be based on a
much more demanding frame of reference than during earlier
periods. As a result, the regime's economic output must satisfy an
increasingly demanding and, by East European standards, very
sophisticated buying public. Therefore, the economic dimension
of crime may be the most significant aspect of this phenomenon
and could have by far the most dramatic impact on the stability of
the regime. In this respect, the case of the GDR is not unique in
Eastern Europe. As both Juviler and Shelley note in their studies,
it is economic crimes that occur with greatest frequency
throughout the USSR and the other Communist party states of the
region. In fact, as Shelley states, the proportion of crimes against
property as compared with those against the person rises steadily
as the nation becomes more industrialized. 55 East Germany, of
course, is among the most advanced states of Eastern 5urope in
terms of its industrialization.
The extent to which crime affects regime stability in the GDR is
further conditioned by official perceptions of the significance of
crime. In the West, criminal behavior is generally regarded as aberrant and not representative of a threat to the legitimacy of social
norms. The aberrant individual merely attempts to "beat the
system"; he does not formally reject the values of the system. His
actions, of course, are seen as an individual problem. Given the
all-embracing, totalist nature of the GDR's social and political
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system, no such view can gain official acceptance. The SED's
ideologically colored outlook mandates a conception under which
crime signifies, ultimately, rejection of regime-sanctioned values.
This is the essence of the belief that all lawlessness has social roots.
The suggestion that imperialist influences trigger criminality only
partially obscures this conclusion. If nothing else, authorities must
come to grips with the fact of socialist society's receptivity to
hostile influences.
At the core of this problem is the party's inability to make explicit distinctions between public and private behavior, a weakness
inherent in almost all Communist party states. The broad socialist
definition of society makes this weakness unavoidable. The legal
provisions introduced in 1979, the "third criminal amendment"
and others, accelerated the process of abolishing legal distinctions
between public and private behavior and, concomitantly, between
political and nonpolitical offenses. Official ability and inclination
to distinguish between what constitutes an offense against private
interest as opposed to public interest has been diminished by adoption of the new regulations. In light of the ideological foundations
of the SED's order, these developments should not surprise
observers. If surprise is expressed, it should be at the delay in imposing formal legal conceptions of this nature.
Nonetheless, lawlessness in the GDR remains essentially
nonrevolutionary. Objectively, one should not depict it as shaking
the foundation stones of the regime. Yet, this nonrevolutionary
behavior may have a revolutionary impact. The SED strives to
restrict this impact and, in some respects, seems to have accomplished much through its efforts. This is most obvious where
direct repression is applied through police measures and wider use
of military authority. In these cases party control is strictly maintained so there is no likelihood that the police/security apparatus
will overshadow the SED. This was clearly demonstrated by
enlargement of Honecker's military role and the requirement that
police officers intensify the ideological basis of their work, thereby
sharpening party direction of their work.
Adoption of the "permissive" approach, however, raises questions about the SED's ability to retain control over all consequences of its programs. The emphasis on greater responsiveness
to public opinion and the effort to achieve more popular feedback
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regarding state programs illustrate the drift toward liberalization
of the system. The record of East European regimes experiencing
the liberalization process is uninspiring. Some, Poland for example, have adapted themselves and maintained stability for a time.
Polish developments of 1980-82, however, demonstrated the limits
of the Polish experiment. Others, such as Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968, have fared even less well. Eventually, in
all of these nations, the process simply could not be controlled and
generated demands exceeding the capacity of the system. In the
East German case, it is not unreasonable to suggest that liberalization, taking place in what has so recently been a rigid and
repressive society, might result in a severe shock to the stability of
the SED's order, at least in the short run. On the other hand, it is
possible that a relaxation of this nature might enhance the GDR's
long-range prospects for endurance if it gets beyond the initial
shock stage.
Even in the absence of such an opening-up of the East German
system, the conclusion that crime will have a direct impact on the
regime's stability is inescapable. The foregoing examination of
crime has been made within the framework of a Marxist perspective, one which the SED consistently applies in its own analyses.
Unfortunately, as the author of a recent study on deviance in
Eastern Europe observed, "Marxist theory makes deviance seem
much more perilous for regime stability." Whereas Western
theories allow that "deviance may be functional" to a society, the
Marxist world view does not. The GDR must, nonetheless, be
judged by the demanding principles it has embraced. The resultant
lesson may be most instructive because, as the scholar above has
concluded, "regimes which are failures according to their own
ideological principles seldom retain either legitimacy or power in
the long run. "56
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Guyana: Changes in Ideology
and Foreign Policy
RALPH R. PREMDAS

ntil recently, the People's National Congress (PNC)
U
government in Guyana, led by President Forbes Burnham,
projected an image asserting socialism as its ideological guide. In
the early 1970s, the Jose Marti award, Cuba's highest honor, was
conferred on Burnham, and during Mao Zedong's regime the
Guyanese president was welcomed in the People's Republic of
China as a fellow comrade. Progressive-to-radical leaders of the
third world, including Castro, Mrs. Bandarnaike, Sekou Toure,
Julius Nyerere, and Mrs. Gandhi were invited to Guyana to
witness the socialist transformation transpiring there. The main
foreign companies were nationalized, bringing 80 percent of the
country's economy under government control.
This radical image was carefully cultivated for nearly a decade,
from 1969 to 1978, and it reflects Burnham's earlier position during the first phase of Guyana's independence movement. Burnham
had allied himself with socialism from 1950 to 1964, as the country
sought independence from British control.
When Burnham first acceded to the leadership of Guyana in
1964, however, he headed a regime that was pro-Western and
capitalist in orientation. Burnham had ousted his former coalition
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